This paper provides an analytical framework for studying principalagent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. The principal may employ a general communication device to extract information from the agent. If the agent's preferences satisfy a single-crossing property, the contracting problem may be solved by replacing the global incentive compatibility constraints by local constraints. Further, it is possible to restrict the dimensionality of the message spaces of the communication device to the number of the agent's types. Therefore, the optimal contract may be derived by using a similar procedure as in contracting problems with full commitment.
Introduction
This paper provides an analytical framework for studying contracting problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. We consider a principal-agent model in which the principal is imperfectly informed about the agent's type. Further, he cannot contractually commit himself to some actions that are payoffrelevant for both parties. The principal may, however, extract information from the agent by employing a general communication device. This device uses as input a report submitted by the agent and generates as output a publicly observable message. The set of possible inputs and outputs and the rules for transforming inputs into outputs are part of the contract. Within this environment, we show that -even with imperfect commitment -the principal's contracting problem can be solved by following a routine that is familiar from the theory of contracting with full commitment: First, the global incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced by local constraints, if the agent's preferences satisfy a standard singlecrossing property. This allows us to concentrate on a relaxed problem that is easier to solve than the original contracting problem. Second, we further simplify the derivation of the optimal communication system by showing that not only the set of ingoing reports but also the set of outgoing messages can be taken as a copy of the set of the agent's types. Thus the agent reveals his type truthfully to the communication system, which then generates a message suggesting a type of the agent. Yet, typically the principal will remain imperfectly informed because the optimal communication system is noisy; it converts the agent's report into a message according to non-degenerate transition probabilities.
Screening problems with full commitment on the part of the mechanism designer are by now fairly well understood. Under simplifying, but reasonable assumptions like one-dimensional asymmetric information and a single-crossing property, the analysis of the underlying contracting problem is relatively straightforward. This makes it attractive for various applications and has lead to a number of important insights into questions of organizational design, financial arrangements, regulation, taxation, etc. Yet, the analytical framework cannot directly be extended to problems that involve some form of imperfect commitment, such as ex post renegotiation (e.g. Dewatripont (1989) ), repeated short-term contracting (e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1986) ), or environments in which the principal takes some non-verifiable, and hence non-contractible, decision (e.g. Khalil (1997) ).
The literature so far has been less successful in developing a manageable framework for these types of contracting problems. Laffont and Tirole (1986) illustrate the difficulties of extending the standard contracting framework to problems of imperfect commitment. It leads them to conclude that "the lack of commitment in repeated adverse-selection situations leads to substantial difficulties for contract theory" (Laffont and Tirole (1993), p. 377) . This paper shows that these difficulties are related to restrictions on the contracting parties' communication possibilities: The literature on contracting with imperfect commitment focuses on one-shot, direct communication. That is, the agent selects a message that is directly observed by the principal. For this type of communication Bester and Strausz (2001) establish a variation of the Revelation Principle 1 which allows stating the contracting problem as a well-defined maximization program with the usual incentive compatibility constraints. Yet, even when the agent's preferences satisfy a single-crossing condition, it remains unclear which of these constraints are binding. Solving the contracting problem requires a laborious checking of all combinations of incentive constraints (e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1987) ). This makes this approach unattractive for applications.
In addition, the restriction to one-shot, direct communication is far from being innocuous. As Aumann and Hart (2003) show, already in a simple cheap talk game with one-sided asymmetric information economic agents may gain by using multi-stage rather that single-stage face-to-face communication. More generally, it is known from the communication literature (Myerson (1982) , Forges (1986) ) that the set of implementable allocations may be strictly larger when players use indirect communication devices instead of direct communication. Hence, focusing on single-shot, direct communication in settings with limited commitment is questionable. The contracting parties may do better by replacing face-to-face communication through indirect communication.
As a consequence, we follow the communication literature by allowing the principal to employ a noisy communication device.
2 This enables him to finetune the information that is actually transmitted about the agent's type. Indeed, as is well-known from the literature (e.g. Dewatripont (1988) , Cremer (1995) and Maskin and Dewatripont (1995) ), the principal may prefer to remain to some degree imperfectly informed because of his lack of commitment.
From the communication literature we can adopt the Revelation Principle for Bayesian games (see: Myerson (1982) , Forges (1986) ) which shows that, without loss of generality, the principal may use an incentive compatible contract. Under such a contract, the set of the agent's reports is simply the set of his types and his optimal strategy is to announce his type truthfully to the communication system. Therefore the contracting problem may be formulated as a maximization problem with incentive and individual rationality constraints. We show that this problem can be drastically simplified when the agent's preferences satisfy a single-crossing condition. Similarly to contracting problems with full commitment, this condition implies a monotonicity property of implementable allocations. Conversely, the monotonicity property together with the downward incentive constraints guarantees that all of the incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions are satisfied. If there are |T | types of the agent, this means that the |T | × |T − 1| + |T | incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints can be replaced by 2 |T | − 1 downward incentive and monotonicity constraints.
Replacing the global incentive constraints by local constraints is, however, only the first step towards making the contracting problem tractable. According to the Revelation Principle for Bayesian games, the communication device involves a set of outgoing messages with the same dimensionality as the set of the principal's actions. This creates a difficulty for computing an optimal communication device when the principal's action set is large. Indeed, many economic applications consider continuous action sets to describe, for example, monetary transfers or effort choices. We address the problem of the dimensionality of the message space by noting that monetary transfers and the vectors of transition probabilities of the communication device enter the principal's problem linearly. Therefore, we can apply a result from the theory of linear semi-infinite programming to show that a message set of dimensionality |T | is sufficient to support an optimal contract as long as the monotonicity constraints are not binding.
In summary, our findings allow us to derive the solution of the contracting problem by using the same methodology as for contracting with full commitment: For a communication system with |T | outgoing messages, we consider a maximization program where the global incentive and individual rationality constraints are replaced by the downward incentive compatibility constraints. If the solution of this program satisfies the monotonicity constraints, then it represents an optimal contract. Otherwise, additional assumptions may be made to ensure that the monotonicity constraints are not binding. We illustrate this methodology in an example with |T | = 2. This example also provides an intuition for why under certain parameter constellations noisy communication is superior to direct communication.
In Section 2 we describe the contracting environment. The concept of a communication device is explained in Section 3. In Section 4 we use the single-crossing assumption to show that the global incentive constraints can be replaced by local constraints. We address the dimensionality of the message space under an optimal communication device in Section 5. In Section 6 we compute the optimal contract for an example. Section 7 contains concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
The Environment
Consider a two-stage contracting problem between a principal and an agent. In the first stage, the principal can contractually commit himself to a decision x ∈ X and a monetary transfer w ∈ IR. In the second stage, he selects a decision y ∈ Y (x) ⊂ Y. The latter decision is not contractible in the first stage and so the principal will choose y at his own discretion. We allow the contractible decision x to limit the feasible set Y (x) of non-contractible decisions.
In addition to the restriction of imperfect commitment, the contracting parties face a problem of one-sided asymmetric information: In stage 1 the agent has private information about his type t i ∈ T = {t 1 , . . . , t |T | }, where |T | < ∞. The principal only knows the probability distribution γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ |T | ) of the agent's type, with γ i > 0 and i γ i = 1. The payoffs of the two parties depend on the agent's type t i , the decisions (x, y) and the monetary transfer w. We denote the principal's payoff by v i (x, y) − w and the agent's payoff by u i (x, y) + w. The agent has the option to refuse to contract with the principal; his reservation payoff equals zero, independently of his type.
Contract theory makes extensive use of single-crossing conditions on the agent's preferences. These conditions imply an ordering of the agent's types, which is natural in many economic environments. In our context we impose a single-crossing property by the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Single-Crossing Property) There exists a z = (z 1 , . . . , z |T | ) ∈ IR |T | ++ and a pair of functions ϕ:
Moreover, either ϕ(x, y) < 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y and z i > z i+1 for all t i ∈ T \{t |T | }, or ϕ(x, y) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y and z i < z i+1 for all t i ∈ T \{t |T | }.
This formulation of the single-crossing property is familiar from contracting problems with full commitment (e.g. Baron and Myerson (1982) , Maskin and Riley (1984) , and Mussa and Rosen (1978) ). Indeed, our framework contains such problems as the special case where the set Y is a singleton. In this case there is no commitment problem and only the contractible decision x is available for screening purposes.
Whenever, for some x ∈ X, the set Y (x) contains more than one element, the principal faces a contracting problem with imperfect commitment. An example is Khalil (1997) , where, after the contracting stage, the principal has the possibility to audit the agent. Since the principal is unable to commit contractually to an auditing strategy, he selects ex-post the probability of an audit from the set Y (x) = Y = [0, 1]. We want to stress, however, that the decision variables x and y may be more general than simple actions. For instance, the decision y may represent a continuation contract in a framework of repeated contracting without commitment (e.g. Tirole (1986, 1987) ). Moreover, since we allow the decision x to restrict the set Y , we may also use our environment to study problems of renegotiation (e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1990) , Rey and Salanie (1996) ). By employing the technique of dynamic programming, our environment is also applicable to multi-stage contracting problems with limited commitment (e.g. Hart and Tirole (1988) ).
3 Hence, our framework is applicable to the type of contracting problems with imperfect commitment that have been addressed in the literature.
Under our Assumption 1 private information is essentially one-dimensional. Consequently, our model addresses the class of one-dimensional screening problem with imperfect commitment. Indeed, as emphasized in Matthews and Moore (1987) , the single-crossing condition only makes sense in problems with onedimensional private information. We do not study multi-dimensional screening problems, which generate a number of analytical difficulties already within the framework of full commitment (see e.g. Rochet and Chone (1998) ).
Communication
To address the problem of asymmetric information, the principal selects a communication device, which is a convenient, technical description of information transmission in most general form.
4 The device allows the agent to send a report upon which the principal receives a message. More specifically, a communication device D = (R, M, B) specifies a set of reports R = {r 1 , . . . , r k , . . . , r |R| } with |R| ≤ ∞, a set of messages M = {m 1 , . . . , m h , . . . , m |M | } with |M | ≤ ∞, and a mapping
In what follows, we use the notation B(r k ) = β k = (β k1 , . . . , β kh , . . . , β k|M | ). The interpretation of a communication system is that the principal receives message m h with probability β kh after the agent has chosen the report r k . Note that the principal cannot directly observe the agent's report.
A communication device D = (R, M, B) is deterministic if R = M and β kk = 1. In this case, the principal receives the message m k with probability one, when the agent sends the report m k . Deterministic communication devices describe standard face-to-face communication, because the agent's report is directly transmitted to the principal without noise. Due to his lack of commitment, however, the principal may prefer not to receive too much information. By using a non-deterministic communication device, he is able to fine-tune the amount of information that is actually transferred to him.
The message received by the principal is publicly verifiable. For a given communication system D, a contract specifies a first-stage decision x = (x 1 , . . . , x h , . . . , x |M | ) and a monetary transfer w = (w 1 , . . . , w h , . . . , w |M | ) contingent upon the message received by the principal. Of course, the principal will also use this message to update his beliefs about the agent's type before selecting his secondstage decision. Let p = (p 11 , . . . , p ih , . . . , p |T ||M | ) denote the principal's beliefs. Thus, upon observing message m h , the principal believes that the agent is of type t i with probability p ih ≥ 0, where i p ih = 1. For each message m h , the principal's strategy y = (y 1 , . . . , y h , . . . , y |M | ) specifies a second-stage decision y h .
6
Given a communication system D and a contract (x, w), the principal and the agent are involved in the following game: First the agent chooses a report, which results in a message to the principal. After receiving a message the principal selects a second-stage decision based upon his beliefs over the agent's type. The contracting parties are constrained to the outcomes that can be realized as a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game.
We allow the agent to employ a mixed reporting strategy and denote by q i = (q i1 , . . . , q ik , . . . , q i|R| ) the strategy of type t i . Thus, the t i -agent selects report r k with probability q ik ≥ 0, where k q ik = 1. When selecting a report, the agent anticipates the principal's decision in the second stage. Therefore, the agent's reporting strategy q = (q 1 , . . . , q i , . . . , q |T | ) is optimal if
for all t i ∈ T. Given the belief p, the principal's behaviour in the second stage has to satisfy
for all m h ∈ M. Finally, the principal's belief is consistent with Bayesian updating if
for all m h ∈ M such that q jk β kh > 0 for some (t j , r k ) ∈ T × R. In summary, (q, y, p) constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium if conditions (2)- (4) are satisfied.
Part of the principal's problem is finding an optimal communication system D. The following result provides a first step in this direction by applying the Revelation Principle for Bayesian games (see: Myerson (1982) , Forges (1986) ). It shows that, without loss of generality, one can assume that the set of the agent's reports is a copy of his types and that the agent reveals his type truthfully to the communication system. asks the agent for his private information and subsequently recommends some action y to the principal. This insight may be helpful for solving the contracting problem if the set Y contains only a few elements. In most applications, however, Y will be large because it includes continuous action choices or the set of continuation contracts in a multi-stage environment. Therefore, we will establish a more suitable restriction on M below in Section 5.
Optimal Contracts
For a given set of messages M, Lemma 1 allows us to state the principal's problem as a programming problem in which the agent's reporting behaviour has to satisfy standard incentive compatibility restrictions. Let β i = (β i1 , . . . , β ih , . . . , β i|M | ) and β = (β 1 , . . . , β i , . . . , β |T | ). Then the principal's objective is to maximize his expected payoff
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
for all t i , t j ∈ T × T ; the agent's individual rationality constraints
for all t i ∈ T ; the no-commitment constraint
and the Bayesian consistency constraint
for all m h such that β jh γ j > 0 for some t j ∈ T. In what follows, we refer to (5)- (9) as the principal's contracting problem for a given message set M. Let V(M ) denote the principal's expected payoff from a solution to this problem.
There remain two difficulties to derive a tractable procedure for solving the principal's problem. First, problem (5)- (9) is stated for a given message set M. Therefore, a characterization of the optimal message set is required. Second, it is unclear which of the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are actually binding. The first difficulty is a fundamental one, while the latter is more of a computational nature. It turns out that the two problems are nevertheless related. By finding an answer to the second problem in this section, we are able to handle the more fundamental one in the following section.
In order to identify the binding constraints, we proceed by relaxing the principal's contracting problem in two directions. First, we follow the standard approach and focus on local rather than global constraints. In problems with full commitment this approach is valid if the agent's preferences satisfy a natural single-crossing condition. Effectively, the single-crossing condition reduces the complexity of the contracting problem because it identifies which of the global incentive-constraints are binding. It is well-known, however, that this assumption fails to simplify the principal's problem under imperfect commitment if he is restricted to a deterministic communication device. Indeed, with this type of communication and lack of commitment "any incentive constraint could turn out to be binding at the optimum" (Laffont and Tirole (1993), p. 377 ). Yet, we will show below that this is no longer the case if the principal is able to employ a noisy communication system. In this situation, the standard approach can be used to study contracting problems for which a single-crossing condition such as Assumption 1 holds.
In addition to considering only local incentive constraints, we relax the problem in a second direction. Rather than considering message-dependent transfers w, we introduce type-dependent transfers ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω i , . . . , ω |T | ). Since we can, for a given β, transform any message-dependent transfer w into a typedependent transfer ω by specifying ω i = h β ih w h , allowing the principal to use type-dependent transfers relaxes his contracting problem. Of course, typedependent transfers are not feasible under a communication system D. But, below we state a simple condition on D which makes it possible to convert the transfers ω back into transfers w.
Specifically, we relax the principal's contracting problem by replacing the global constraints (6) and (7) in the principal's contracting problem by downward incentive and monotonicity constraints. The downward incentive constraints require that
for all t i ∈ T, where ω 0 ≡ 0 and β 0h ≡ 0 for all m h ∈ M . The monotonicity constraints are satisfied if
for all t i ∈ T \{t 1 }.
In summary, we analyse the following relaxed contracting problem for a given message set M :
subject to (8), (9), (10), and (11).
For a given message set M, let W(M ) denote the principal's expected payoff from a solution of the relaxed contracting problem (12). The following lemma shows that the constraints of the relaxed problem are implied by the constraints of the original problem.
Lemma 2 If there exists a (x, y, w, β, p) satisfying the constraints of the principal's contracting problem, then there exists a (x, y, ω, β, p) satisfying the constraints of the relaxed contracting problem. Therefore,
Obviously, the downward incentive constraints are binding in the relaxed contracting problem, because otherwise the principal could increase his payoff by lowering ω. This in combination with the single-crossing condition on preferences allows us to show that the local constraints (10) and (11) are sufficient to guarantee global incentive compatibility and individual rationality. This is the first step towards showing that the solution of the principal's contracting problem can be derived from solving the relaxed problem. In a second step we have to transform the type-dependent transfers ω * from the solution of the relaxed problem back into message-contingent transfers w. This is possible whenever the communication system D satisfies the following condition:
implies that
The Regularity Condition is satisfied if the vectors β i , i = 1, . . . , |T |, are linearly independent. But it is weaker than linear independence as it allows for the possibility that β i = β i−1 . Notice further that the Regularity Condition always holds if |T | = 2.
At this point we may state our first result: The proposition shows that the solution of the principal's contracting problem can be obtained by solving the relaxed problem. Indeed, under the single-crossing property of Assumption 1, the monotonicity conditions together with the downward incentive constraints are sufficient for the global incentive and individual rationality constraints in the original contracting problem. Further, the Regularity Condition guarantees that the type-dependent transfers obtained from the relaxed problem can be transformed into transfers that are compatible with the communication system.
The relaxed problem (12) is much easier to solve than the original problem (5), because the |T | × |T − 1| + |T | constraints in (6) - (7) are replaced by the 2 |T | − 1 constraints in (10) -(11). In fact, the usual approach to screening problems with full commitment is to ignore the |T | − 1 monotonicity constraints in (11) and then to check under what conditions, e.g. on the distribution of the agent's types, they are automatically satisfied by the solution. Proposition 1 shows that, as long as the Regularity Condition holds, the same procedure can be used to solve the principal's problem in the context of imperfect commitment.
Optimal Message Spaces
Although Proposition 1 indicates how to solve the principal's contracting problem for a given message space M , it does not say anything about the optimal dimensionality of the message set itself. To investigate this issue, we say that M * is an optimal message set if V(M * ) ≥ V(M ) for any other message set M .
In this context, an insight from the theory of linear optimization turns out to be useful. To describe a linear program, let A be an n × m-matrix, c ∈ IR m and b ∈ IR n . For finite n and (possibly) infinite m the following program is a linear semi-infinite program with m decision variables x ∈ IR m + and n constraints:
By a fundamental result in the theory of linear programming, whenever a finite linear program has a solution, then one can be found among the extreme points of the set of feasible solutions in (14). Therefore the program has a basic solution x * , i.e. the number of non-zero components of x * is no greater than the rank of A. The following lemma extends this result to linear problems with an infinite number of decision variables.
Lemma 3 If there exists a solution x * ∈ IR m to program (14), then there exists a solution x with at most n non-zero components.
Of course, the relaxed contracting problem (12) is not a linear programming problem. But, we can apply the above lemma by replacing each vector β h = (β 1h , . . . , β |T |h ) by λ h β h , with λ h ≥ 0, and adding the constraints h λ h β h = 1 for all m h ∈ M. By keeping x, y, β and p fixed, we thus construct a programming problem that is linear in λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ |M | ) and ω. Lemma 3 then allows us to show that there is an upper bound on the number of messages m h for which a solution of the relaxed problem requires that λ h > 0. Since all other messages with λ h = 0 are redundant, we obtain a restriction on the dimensionality of the optimal message set.
Proposition 2 Let (x * , y * , ω * , β * , p * ) be a solution of the relaxed contracting problem for the message set M = T. Suppose that the monotonicity constraints (11) are not binding and that β * satisfies the Regularity Condition. Then M = T is an optimal message set.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2, an optimal communication system has a rather simple structure: The agent reports his type truthfully and the principal receives a message that indicates a type of the agent. Yet, in general the principal remains imperfectly informed because the communication device is noisy; it thus may suggest a type to the principal that differs from the true type, as reported by the agent.
Proposition 2 reveals how imperfect commitment influences the communication between the contracting parties: The Revelation Principle for contracting games with perfect commitment shows that M = T is an optimal message set. Further, under perfect commitment it is always optimal to set β i i = 1, i.e. the agent's honest report about his type is transmitted without distortions to the principal. Typically, this form of 'direct' communication is no longer optimal when the principal cannot contractually commit himself to all of his actions. In this situation, he may prefer to become imprecisely informed by setting β i i < 1.
In the following section, an example shows how Proposition 2 can be used to derive the optimal contract by a procedure that is familiar from the analysis of screening problems with full commitment: First, the relaxed problem is solved for M = T under the presumption that the monotonicity constraints are not binding. To verify that this solution is an optimal contract, one then simply has to ensure that the monotonicity constraints and the Regularity Condition are not violated.
An Example
In this section we apply our Proposition 2 to analyse strategic information transmission in an example inspired by Crawford and Sobel (1982) . The principal has to select a non-contractible decision y ∈ IR. In contrast with the more general setting considered in the previous sections, there is no contractible decision x. There are two types of the agent, t 1 and t 2 , and each type is equally likely. The agent's payoffs are
and satisfy Assumption 1 for ϕ(x, y) = −y 2 , ψ(x, y) = 2y and z 1 = 1/2 > z 2 = 1/4. The principal's payoff is
Note that our example differs from the cheap-talk game in Crawford and Sobel (1982) because here the principal can contractually commit to a monetary transfer.
The parameters b 1 and b 2 reflect a bias between the principal's and the agent's preferences. For b 1 = b 2 = 0 the most preferred decisions of both parties coincide. In this case, the revelation of information is unproblematic, because incentives are fully aligned. Consequently, the principal can, despite his lack of commitment, implement the first-best decisions y 1 = 2 and y 2 = 4 through the transfers (w 1 , w 2 ) = (−2, −4).
We now apply Proposition 2 to solve the relaxed contracting problem for the message set M = T = {t 1 , t 2 }. At this stage we ignore the monotonicity constraint (11); we will verify later on that it is automatically satisfied. Also, recall that we may disregard the Regularity Condition (13) as |T | = 2. To simplify notation, let β 1 = β 11 and β 2 = β 22 so that (1 − β 1 ) = β 12 and (1 − β 2 ) = β 21 .
In a first step, we solve the downward incentive constraints (10) for (ω 1 , ω 2 ) and substitute the solution into the principal's objective.
8 The principal's expected payoff then becomes
The first two terms represent the principal's and the agent's joint surplus. Yet, the principal's objective differs from maximizing the social surplus because of the third term, which reflects the distortion arising from incentive compatibility considerations.
If the principal could commit to (y 1 , y 2 ), he would simply have to choose (β 1 , β 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) to maximize V . Using the linearity of V (·) in (β 1 , β 2 ), it is easy to show that in this case β 1 = β 2 = 1, y 1 = (8 − 2b 1 )/5 and y 2 = (32 + 8b 2 )/(8 + b 2 ) would solve the principal's problem. Thus, in line with the revelation principle for contracting with full commitment, the agent's type is communicated without noise. Further, as y 2 maximizes the joint surplus v 2 (y 2 ) + u 2 (y 2 ), there is no 'distortion at the top'.
With imperfect commitment, however, the principal's choice of (y 1 , y 2 ) has to obey also the no-commitment constraints (8) and the Bayesian consistency constraints (9). We can combine these constraints to describe the principal's strategy (y * 1 , y * 2 ) by the first order conditions
By substituting the solution (y * 1 , y * 2 ) into V (·) we obtain a function V (β 1 , β 2 ) so that the optimal communication device is a solution of the program
To illustrate how the bias between the principal's and the agent's preferences affects the revelation of information, we focus on cases where a bias exists only for one type of the agent. We first investigate the parameter constellation b 1 = 0 and b 2 > 0. In this case, the preferences of the t 1 -agent and the principal are fully aligned. With regard to type t 2 , however, the principal's most preferred decision Under the conditions of Proposition 3 the t 2 -agent's report is always transmitted without noise to the principal. For sufficiently large values of the bias b 2 , however, this is not true for the report of the t 1 -agent. Thus the principal always knows that he is facing type t 1 after receiving the message t 1 . But when b 2 > (1 + √ 57)/2, the message t 2 can originate from either type of the agent. In fact, β * 1 = 0 for b 2 > 8 + 2 √ 33, i.e. there is full pooling and the message t 2 is completely uninformative.
The observation that full information revelation is optimal only for small values of b 2 has a straightforward intuition. If the principal concludes that the agent's type is t 2 , he will take a decision that is undesirably large from the agent's perspective. Anticipating this, type t 2 will demand a large expected payment to participate in the contract. Therefore, full information revelation hurts the principal ex ante because of his ex post incentive to select a large y 2 . The only possibility to commit ex ante to a lower value of y 2 , is to make the message t 2 less informative. Indeed, the higher the likelihood of facing type t 1 , the lower is principal's choice of y 2 . Thus noisy communication prevents the principal from taking decisions that are excessive from the ex ante perspective.
Under the optimal contract, the incentive compatibility constraint (6) for type t 1 holds as an inequality. As long as β * 1 > 0, this implies u 1 (y * 1 )+w 1 > u 1 (y * 2 )+w 2 . This means that type t 1 is not indifferent between the outcomes induced by messages t 1 and t 2 . Consequently, the optimal contract cannot be implemented by a random reporting strategy of the agent. This shows that by using a noisy communication device the principal can get a higher payoff than with mere faceto-face communication, as studied in Bester and Strausz (2001) .
We now turn to the case where b 1 > 0 and b 2 = 0. In this case, the preferences of both parties coincide only if the agent's type is t 2 . Otherwise, the principal tends to select a decision that is smaller than the agent's most preferred decision. The right part of Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the principal's objective function for this case. 10 Again, this leads to the conclusion that the monotonicity constraint (11) is automatically satisfied. The second picture in Figure 2 shows how the bias-parameter b 1 affects β * 2 and (y * 1 , y * 2 ). For b 1 ≥ 0 and b 2 = 0, the principal receives a noisy message of the t 2 -agent's report when the bias b 1 is sufficiently large. He therefore remains imperfectly informed after receiving the message t 1 . The intuition here is analogous to the one for Proposition 4: Through imperfect information the principal can at least partially commit himself not to select a decision y 1 that is inefficiently small from the ex ante viewpoint.
The optimal communication device for b 1 ≥ 0 and b 2 = 0, however, has an interesting feature that differs from the implications of Proposition 3. Since the (downward) incentive constraint for type t 2 in (6) is binding, we have u 2 (y * 2 )+w 2 = u 2 (y * 1 ) + w 1 as long as β * 2 > 0. Thus type t 2 is indifferent between the outcomes of message t 1 and t 2 . As a consequence, the principal could implement the optimal contract also through simple face-to-face communication. With this kind of communication, the t 2 -agent would adopt a random reporting strategy and select the report t 1 with probability q 21 = 1 − β * 2 and the report t 2 with probability q 22 = β * 2 . Under the conditions of Proposition 4, therefore, direct communication between the principal and the agent can implement the same outcome as the optimal communication device.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a framework to study principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. The literature on such problems has limited itself to direct, one-shot communication between the contracting parties. This limitation not only restricts the parties' communication capabilities, it also makes it difficult to identify the binding incentive constraints of the contracting problem. We allow the contracting parties to make use of a general communication device. This simplifies the derivation of the optimal contract. Indeed, if the agent's preferences satisfy a single-crossing condition, the global incentive constraints can be replaced by local constraints in the same way as in screening problems with full commitment. Further, we derive an upper bound on the dimensionality of message sets under an optimal communication device. These insights yield a tractable procedure for solving screening problems with imperfect commitment. 
Further letq satisfyq ii = 1 for all t i ∈ T, andq ij = 0 whenever t i = t j .
Then kqikβkh =β ih = k q ik β kh , which proves the second part of Lemma 1. This immediately implies that (q, y, p) satisfies conditions (3) and (4) of a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the communication systemD. It thus remains to show that (q, y, p) satisfies also condition (2). Suppose the contrary, i.e. there exists a q such that
for some q i and some t i ∈ T. This implies that there is a t j ∈ T such that
Therefore, by definition ofβ ih andβ jh ,
By this inequality, q i fails to satisfy (2) and so it is not an optimal reporting strategy for type t i under the communication system D. Therefore, (q, y, p) is not a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the communication system D, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: First, we show that the incentive constraints in (6) imply the monotonicity constraints in (11). By Assumption 1, the incentive constraints in (6) imply that
for all t i ∈ T \{t 1 }. Adding these inequalities yields
Since Assumption 1 implies (z i − z i−1 )ϕ(x, y) > 0, this shows that (6) implies (11). By defining ω i = h β ih w h , it immediately follows that (6) implies (10). This confirms the first part of the lemma.
To prove the second statement, let (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) be a solution to the principal's contracting problem leading to the payoff V(M ). Define ω * i = h β * ih w * h . Since (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) satisfies the constraints (6) and (7), it follows by the argument above that (x * , y * , ω * , β, p * ) satisfies (10) and (11). Therefore, (x * , y * , ω * , β * , p * ) satisfies all the constraints in (12) and
Therefore, the principal's expected payoff from the solution of the relaxed problem cannot be less than V(M ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that for (x * , y * , ω * , β * , p * ) all the constraints in (10) are binding. Indeed, if the inequality would hold for the downward constraint of some type t i , then the principal could increase his expected payoff by lowering ω i without violating any other constraint in (10).
We first show that if, in addition, β * satisfies the Regularity Condition, then there exist message-dependent wages w such that the downward incentive constraints in (6) of the types t 2 , . . . , t |T | and the individual rationality constraint (7) of type t 1 are binding. That is, we show that there exists a w * such that
for all t i ∈ T. A solution w * of (25) exists if and only if the equations
have no solution k = (k 1 , . . . , k i , . . . , k |T | ). Suppose to the contrary that (26) and (27) have a solution k. Since h β * ih = 1 for all t i ∈ T and β * 0h ≡ 0, we have
Consequently, the Regularity Condition (13) implies that (26) has only solutions such that k i = 0 whenever
a contradiction to (27). Hence, (25) has a solution w * and this solution satisfies
. It remains to show that the combination (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) satisfies the incentive compatibility conditions (6) and the individual rationality conditions (7). Define
so that we may rewrite (25) as
for all t i ∈ T \{t 1 }. Applying (31) iteratively yields
Thus, for all (t i , t j ) ∈ T × T,
where the inequality follows because the monotonicity condition (11) and Assumption 1 imply Sign(
By (34) and (35), we obtain that (33) is non-negative so that z i θ i + µ i ≥ z i θ j + µ j for all (t i , t j ) ∈ T × T. This shows that (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) satisfies the incentive compatibility conditions in (6).
To show that (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) also satisfies the individual rationality conditions (7), note that the equality for t 1 in (25) implies
As we have shown that (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) satisfies the incentive compatibility conditions (6), we have for all
, where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity condition (11). Thus also the individual rationality conditions in (7) are satisfied.
We conclude that (x * , y * , w * , β * , p * ) satisfies all constraints (6)- (9) of the principal's problem. It yields the principal the payoff V (x * , y * , w
By Lemma 2 the original contracting problem cannot yield more than W(M ) and so we have V(M ) = W(M ).
Proof of Lemma 3:
If x * has finitely many non-zero entries, then Theorem 2.5 of Anderson and Nash (1987, p.23) shows that there exists a basic optimal solution to program (14). Since Rank(A) ≤ n, it follows that a basic solution to (14) has at most n non-zero entries. Now suppose x * has infinitely many nonzero entries. Following the approach of the proof of Theorem 4.8 of Anderson and Nash (1987, p.76) , we show that there exists a solutionx with at most n + 2 non-zero entries such that we may apply Theorem 2.5 of Anderson and Nash (1987, p.23) .
Let V * ≡ h c h x * h be the value of program (14). Extend the matrix A by adding the row vector c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . .) toÂ. That is,Â ∈ IR (n+1)×m consists of the column vectorsâ i = (a 1i , a 2i , . . . , a ni , c i ). Consequently, any x ≥ 0 which is a solution toÂ
is also a solution to (14), as it satisfies Ax = b and has the value c.x = V * . In particular, x * is a solution to (38). Define the cone C = {λâ i |λ ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , } ⊂ IR n+1 generated by the column vectors (â 1 ,â 2 , . . .) inÂ. Sincê
b is an infinite mixture of points in C and, because C lies in the finite Euclidean space IR n+1 , it follows thatb lies in the convex hull of C (Rubin and Wesler (1958) ). Hence, Caratheodory's theorem (Rockafellar (1970) , Theorem 17.1, p. 155) implies thatb can be written as a convex combination of k ≤ n + 2 elements (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ k ) in C. That is, there exists (µ 1 , . . . , µ k ) with i µ i = 1 and µ i ≥ 0 such thatb
Since for each ξ j ∈ C there exists an i(j) such that ξ j can be written as λ jâi(j) , we may rewriteb asb
Now let J(i) ≡ {j|i(j) = i} and definex i ≡ J(i) µ j λ j . It follows thatx has at most k ≤ n + 2 non-zero entries and satisfies (38 
subject to (8), (9) and
for all t i ∈ T .
Now suppose the message set T is not optimal. Obviously, the principal cannot get a higher payoff by using a message setM with |M | < |T |. Accordingly, there must exist a message setM with |M | > |T | such that V(M ) > V(T ) = W * . Lemma 2 implies that for the relaxed contracting problem with respect toM it is the case that W(M ) ≥ V(M ) > W * . We will show that this yields the contradiction that (x * , y * , ω * , β * , p * ) does not solve program (42) for the message set M = T .
Let the combination (x,ȳ,ω,β,p) represent a solution of the relaxed contracting problem given the message setM , i.e. W (x,ȳ,ω,β,p) = W(M ). Since all downward incentive constraints (10) are binding,ω together with λ 1 = . . . = λ |M | = 1 solves the program
subject to
for all t i ∈ T ; and λ h ≥ 0 for all m h ∈M . Solving (45) for ω yields
for all t i ∈ T . By substitution we may therefore rewrite problem (44)- (46) as
and λ h ≥ 0 for all m h ∈M .
The objective function and constraints of problem (48)- (49) are linear in λ. According to Lemma 3 it has therefore a solution λ * with k ≤ |T | strictly positive entries λ *
We first show that V 1 does not have a maximizer in the interior of D. Since for any b 2 ≥ 0 the function V 1 is differentiable on D, this obtains if there is no combination (β 1 , β 2 ) that satisfies the first and second order conditions for a maximum. However, rather than showing this for V 1 (β 1 , β 2 ) directly, it is more convenient to consider the functionV
The first order condition for maximizingV 1 with respect to α 1 yields
Hence, if (α * 1 , α * 2 ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 maximizesV 1 , then α * 2 maximizesV 1 (α * 1 (α 2 ), α 2 ). The first order condition of V 1 (α * 1 (α 2 ), α 2 ) with respect to α 2 is satisfied for
and
However, α *
2 ) = 0. We conclude that the maximizers ofV 1 do not lie in its interior domain (0, 1) × (0, 1).
This implies that the original function V 1 (β 1 , β 2 ) does not have a maximum in the interior of the domain D either. Consequently, a maximizer (β * 1 , β * 2 ) is found on the border of D. Since for any β ∈ [0, 1] it holds V 1 (β, 1 − β) = V 1 (1, 0) = V 1 (0, 1), a maximizer exists with either β 1 = 1 or β 2 = 1. First, for V 1 (1, β 2 ) the first order condition with respect to β 2 is satisfied for 
which lies in [0, 1] only for b 2 ∈ (1+ √ 17, 6). However, the second order derivative evaluated at (β 1 , β 2 ) = (1, β 
which is positive for b 2 > 2. Since 1 + √ 17 > 2 this implies that the second order condition for a maximum is violated. Hence, whenever β 1 = 1 is optimal than either β 2 = 0 or β 2 = 1 optimal. But since it holds that V 1 (1, 0) = V 1 (0, 1) it follows that a maximizer (β 1 , β 2 ) exists with β 2 = 1.
For V 1 (β 1 , 1) the first order condition with respect to β 1 is satisfied for 
such that for b 2 ∈ [(1 + √ 57)/2, 8 + 2 √ 33] the second order condition is indeed satisfied. Consequently, the values (β * 1 , β * 2 ) stated in Proposition 3 solve program (19).
Proof of Proposition 4:
We proceed along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 3. For b 2 = 0 substitution of (51) into V (β 1 , β 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) yields Again, the function V 2 (·) is symmetric along the diagonal (1, 0) − (0, 1), and it is therefore sufficient to maximize V 2 over the domain D = {(β 1 , β 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 |β 1 + β 2 ≥ 1}.
We first show that V 2 does not have a maximizer in the interior of D. Since for any b 1 ≥ 0 the function V 1 is differentiable on D, this obtains if there is no combination (β 1 , β 2 ) that satisfies the first and second order conditions for a maximum. However, rather than showing this for V 2 (β 1 , β 2 ) directly, it is more convenient to consider the functionV 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) ≡ V 2 (1−α 1 α 2 , α 2 ) over the domain (α 1 , α 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] .
Hence, if (α * 1 , α * 2 ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 maximizesV 2 , then α * 1 maximizesV 2 (α 1 , α * 2 (α 1 )). The first order condition of V 2 (α 1 , α * 2 (α 1 )) with respect to α 1 is satisfied for 
However, the second order derivative evaluated at (β 1 , β 2 ) = (β 
which is positive such that the second order condition for a maximum is violated. Hence, whenever β 2 = 1 is optimal then either β 1 = 0 or β 1 = 1 is optimal. But since it holds that V 2 (0, 1) = V 2 (1, 0) it follows that a maximizer (β 1 , β 2 ) exists with β 1 = 1.
For V 2 (1, β 2 ) the first order condition with respect to β 1 is satisfied for 
such that the second order condition is satisfied. Consequently, the values (β * 1 , β * 2 ) stated in Proposition 4 solve program (19).
